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HOW TO CO-EXIST WITH NONEXISTENT EXPECTATIONS
RANDALL G. MCCUTCHEON
Abstract. Dozens of articles have addressed the challenge that gambles hav-
ing undened expectation pose for decision theory. This paper makes two con-
tributions. The rst is incremental: we evolve Colyvan's \Relative Expected
Utility Theory" into a more viable \conservative extension of expected utility
theory" by formulating and defending emendations to a version of this theory
proposed by Colyvan and Hajek. The second is comparatively more surprising.
We show that, so long as one assigns positive probability to the theory that
there is a uniform bound on the utility of possible gambles (and assuming a uni-
form bound on the amount of utility that can accrue in a xed amount of time),
standard principles of anthropic reasoning (as formulated by Brandon Carter)
place lower and upper bounds on the expected values of gambles advertised as
having no expectation{even assuming that with positive probability, all gam-
bles advertised as having innite expected utility are administered faithfully.
Should one accept the uniform bound premises, this reasoning thus dissolves
(or nearly dissolves, in some cases) several puzzles in innite decision theory.
1. Introduction
We address, in this paper, the challenge that gambles having innite or undened
expectation create for decision theory. Our investigation splits into two separate
questions. The rst question is how to respond to oers of gambles advertised as
having innite or no expectation, conditional on their being genuine, i.e. faith-
fully administered. In the case of innite expectation, there is no real problem
here; one should pay any (nite) price for a gamble having innite expected pay-
o. However, we've found that one must forebear on ranking any no-expectation
gamble relative to the status quo, lest one succumb to a Dutch Book. In the rst
part of the paper, we explain these matters and summarize our recommendations
in an emended version of Mark Colyvan's \Relative Expectation Theory".
Later, we address the question of how to respond to an oered gamble X that
is advertised as innite or no expectation in the face of natural doubts that
such gambles are possible at all. The challenge is that if one assigns positive
probability to the notion that the oer of X is genuine, it may seem that one
must assign X an innite or non-existent expectation. According to the most
successful version of anthropic reasoning (Brandon Carter's anthropic principle),
however, self-selection eects may serve to mitigate this response. For it seems
that, if one assigns any positive probability to the theory that innite or no
expectation gambles are impossible, one must on reasoning anthropically assign
X a bounded posterior expectation. If one accepts the premises of this argument
(one of which is that there is some upper bound on the rate at which utility may
1
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accrue), it would seem to dissolve many (if not most) puzzles in innite decision
theory at a stroke. Accordingly, we believe that it deserves careful scrutiny.
2. The Dutch Book Argument Against Assigning Values to No
Expectation Gambles
As point of departure to the strange and \unexpected" results glossed above we
consider in the next two sections a no expectation gamble that has been given
a great deal of recent attention{Harris Nover and Alan Hajek's Pasadena Game
(2004). Suppose a fair coin is tossed just until it rst lands heads. Letting n be
the number of tosses required, the Pasadena gamble pays X = ( 1)
n 12n
n
dollars.
Since the expectation series for X,
X
r2R
rP (X = r) =
1X
n=1
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n
 2 n = 1 
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+
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 
1
4
+    = log 2
converges conditionally, X has no dened expectation.1 Expected utility theory
is, therefore, silent concerning the value of this game.2 Nover and Hajek write:
It is an uncomfortable silence. For intuition tells us...that we can make
meaningful comparisons between the Pasadena game and other games. It
is clearly worse than the St. Petersburg game [pays Y = 2n dollars], for
starters. It is clearly worse than a neighbouring variant of the game {call
it the Altadena game{in which every pay-o is raised by a dollar. (...)
And the Pasadena game is clearly better than a `negative' St. Petersburg
game, in which all the pay-os of the St. Petersburg game are switched
in sign. Yet expected utility theory can say none of this.
Yet \Dutch Book reasoning" does seem to show that one cannot coherently value
the Pasadena gamble relative to the null gamble. For suppose that you value
it at log 2. (It's easily checked that any value would lead to the same trouble.)
Then you can be Dutch Booked as follows. First you are oered the chance to
pay :69 < log 2 to play the game. You accept and are put to sleep. While you
sleep, your payo will be determined as follows. First, a fair 4-sided die is rolled
repeatedly until something less than a 4 is rolled. Let N be the number of rolls
it takes. Repeat the procedure and let M be the number of rolls it takes the
second time. Finally let Y be the result of a rolling of a fair 3-sided die. If Y = 3,
let n = 2M . Otherwise, let n = 2N   1. Your payo is now ( 1)
n 12n
n
dollars
(a Pasadena gamble). Note: if Y < 3 and n = 2N   1 you are winning money,
whereas if Y = 3 and n = 2M you are losing money.
1Like any conditionally convergent series, the expectation series can thus be made to diverge
(or converge to any nite value whatsoever) by rearrangement of its terms. On the other
hand, as noted by Kenny Easwaran (2008), X does have a weak expectation of log 2. Since
weak expectations are invariant under rearrangements, log 2 therefore has some claim to be the
presumptive value of the game, if it has one.
2We take utility to be linear with respect to currency, and in particular unbounded.
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When all that's completed, you are awakened and told the value N (but not M
and not Y ). So you don't know whether or not you've won, nor how much you've
lost if you've lost. You do however know that if you've won, you've won 22N 1
dollars. At this point, you are given the opportunity to annul the gamble (but
you don't get your .69 back). The expectation series for your payo is now
2
3
 22N 1 +
1X
M=1
1
22M

 22M
2M
=
2
3
 22N 1  
1
2
 
1
4
 
1
6
     =  1;
so you are compelled to accept this oer (indeed, you were let o easy{you would
have paid any nite amount to annul the gamble). You have thus lost a sure .69.3
The lesson is this: if you assign faithful implementations of no expectation gambles
values and believe you are being oered one then your decision theory is diachron-
ically incoherent in a strong sense{you fall prey to a nitary Dutch Book.4
3. Other responses
If one can't place values on no expectation gambles, how should one respond
to their oer? (Assume for the present that one takes them to be faithfully
administered.) Hajek and Nover (2006) write:
Here are...possible responses to the Pasadena game (...): 1. The game
is coherent, and decision theory cannot handle it{too bad for decision
theory. Compare: Russell's paradox was a decisive blow against Frege's
set theory. Too bad for that set theory. 2. The game is incoherent, so
it is not a black mark that decision theory cannot handle it{too bad for
the game. Compare: the town barber, who shaves all and only those in
the town who do not shave themselves, poses no problem for logic, or for
anything else; he simply cannot exist, because the specication of him is
incoherent. Too bad for the barber. (...) We maintain response (1)....
The admonition we perceive here is somewhat dierent. In fact, Russell's paradox
is a decisive blow against any set theory that chooses to \handle" (treat as a set)
the Russell object (the collection of sets that don't contain themselves). The
standard response to it, accordingly, has been to deny such collections \sethood"
while retaining such sets as are required by those who employ them sincerely.
The issue isn't that such collections are incoherent, but that they are too exotic
to be coherently treated in the manner of more conventional collections. (In
some versions of modern set theory, they are termed \proper classes".) As to the
Pasadena game, then, we advocate for a third response running as follows: \The
3What makes this Dutch Book work is that the positive and negative parts of the Pasadena
variable each have innite expectation, and the argument can be generalized to show that one
cannot coherently place a value on any such variable. It is probably fair to say that the argument
is implicit in the \Two Envelopes" literature; see especially Broome (1995) and Chalmers (2002).
4By Finitary Dutch Book we intend an almost surely nite sequence X1;    ; XN of gambles
(here N is a \stopping time"), each deemed individually favorable at time of oer (information
may be obtained between gambles), but entailing an almost sure net loss, such that either (a)
N is uniformly bounded, or (b)
P
N
i=1
E(minfXi; 0g) >  1 almost surely. (See the appendix.)
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game is coherent, but it is too exotic to be coherently treated in the manner of
more conventional gambles. So it is not a black mark that decision theory cannot
handle it." We would say, in fact, that the above Dutch Book argument is a black
mark against any decision theory that purports to handle it.
Succinctly, we hold that decision theory should incorporate some form of restric-
tion on gamble formation. We don't think, however, that Hajek and Nover (2006)
are thorough enough in seeking the form such restriction might take. They write:
\There are two possible lines of attack{neither satisfactory, in our opinion. (...)
Restrict decision theory to nite state spaces (...) Restrict decision theory to
bounded utility functions." Neither of these moves is, strictly speaking, justied:
if A contracts to pay B one dollar per year so long as both live, the expected gain
to B in the nth year of this contract decays rapidly in n, but isn't zero for any n.
Of course, one might say that when n is large, the expected gain to B in the nth
year is negligible. Nicholas J.J. Smith (2014) defends a decision rule that attempts
to formalize this idea. As we'll see, however, the results remain unsatisfactory.
Rationally negligible probabilities (RNP): For any lottery featuring in any
decision problem faced by any agent, there is an  > 0 such that the agent need
not consider outcomes of that lottery of probability less than  in coming to a
fully rational decision.
For variables of nite expectation, RNP is harmless enough; as  ! 0, the
relative eect of employing RNP instead of standard expectation tends to zero
with . In this sense, RNP is an extension of (nite) expected utility theory. This
observation can be used to respond to Hajek (2014), who seeks to discredit RNP
using a zero expectation gamble (credited to John Matthewson) which RNP's
vanishing error term causes to look favorable (if innitesimally). But although
nite expectation gambles fail to discredit this more robust limit version of RNP,
even it sanctions some embarrassing preferences.
Game: A dime is tossed until it comes up heads (on the nth toss). Then a nickel
is tossed. If the nickel comes up heads, you win 2n dollars. If it comes up tails,
you lose 2n dollars.
RNP instructs us to ignore outcomes having probability below some threshold
 > 0. So there is an n depending on  such that Game's value is:
(:25)(2) (:25)(2)+(:125)(4)+( :125)(4)+   +(2 n 1)(2n)+( 2 n 1)(2n) = 0:
Thus the value of Game is zero, independently of .
Now consider a variant of Game in which, if the nickel lands heads, a penny is
also tossed. If the penny lands heads, it is added to your winnings. Otherwise
everything is as before. This variant's value is:
( :25)(2) + (:125)(2:01) + (:125)(2) + ( :125)(4) + (:0625)(4:01) + (:0625)(4)
+(:0625)(8) +   + (2 n 1)(2n 1 + :01) + (2 n 1)(2n 1) + (2 n 1)(2n) <  :49:
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This inequality holds independently of .
So according to RNP, Game has value V1 = 0 and the variant V2 <  :49,
independently of . But the only dierence between Game and the variant is
that in the latter there is a penny that you might get to keep.
4. Relative Expected Utility Theory
The failures of RNP and other approaches involving bounded utility functions or
credence functions supported on nitely many points notwithstanding, we believe
that there is a good way to avoid paradox by restriction. Indeed, Mark Colyvan
has been championing an approach along these lines that is promising. We'll
outline the evolution of Colyvan's proposal and indicate how we think it needs to
be altered in order to yield a satisfactory theory.
First Colyvan pointed out (see Colyvan 2006) that a preference for Altadena over
Pasadena can be established by dominance reasoning. Next (see Colyvan 2008) he
formulated a \relative expected utility theory", a joint extension of nite expected
utility theory and just this sort of dominance reasoning:
REU Dominance: Let X be any random variable taking values in the
natural numbers N = f1; 2; : : :g. Let Game A pay ai and let Game B
pay bi when X = i, i 2 N. Put REU(A;B) =
P1
i=1 P (X = i)(ai   bi)
if the right hand side converges or diverges to innity. Then Game A
is preferable to Game B if and only if REU(A;B) > 0.
In this original formulation, REU Dominance has several undesirable features.
Among these are (a) its recommendations depend upon the way in which one
orders the alternatives; and (b) it may indicate a preference for a gamble X over
an identically distributed gamble Y 5. Colyvan and Hajek (2016) accordingly make
two emendations toREU dominance. The rst is to insist that REU(A;B) only
be dened when the sum
P
i2N P (X = i)(ai  bi) is insensitive to the ordering of
the indices.6 (See also footnote 12 in Bartha 2016.) This xes problem (a), and
as we'll presently see (Theorem 1 below), it also xes problem (b).
Colyvan and Hajek don't stop there, however. They proceed to introduce a second
emendation. We will make a digression to discuss this second emendation (which
we will ultimately reject). They motivate it by a comparison of the following bets:
Bet 1: Pays 5 if a fair coin toss lands heads; nothing otherwise;
5For example, let the state probabilities pi = P (X = i) be given by (p1; p2; : : : ; ) =
( 1
4
; 1
8
; 1
16
; 1
4
; 1
32
; 1
64
; 1
128
; 1
8
; 1
256
; 1
512
; 1
1024
; 1
16
; 1
2048
; : : :). (The pattern is p4n+4 =
1
2
p4n, p4n+i =
1
8
p4n+i 4, i = 1; 2; 3.) Next let (a1; a2; : : : ; ) = (2; 4; 8; 0; 16; 32; 64; 0; 128; 256; 512; 0; 1024; : : :)
and (b1; b2; : : : ; ) = (0; 0; 0; 2; 0; 0; 0; 4; 0; 0; 0; 8; 0; : : : ): aX and bX are identically distributed, but
REU dominance judges aX preferable to bY ; in particular,
P4n
i=1
pi(ai   bi) = n ! 1. What
makes this example work is of course an ordering under which the states associated with positive
outcomes for aX suciently precede the corresponding states having positive outcomes for bY :
6What Colyvan and Hajek actually say is that REU(A;B) =
P
1
i=1
P (X = i)(ai  bi) \where
the right-hand side absolutely converges, or diverges to innity or negative innity." That
generates sensitivity to order, as any conditionally convergent series has rearrangements tending
to (positive or negative) innity. We believe that our formulation corresponds to their intention.
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Bet 2: Pays 6 if a fair die toss lands even; nothing otherwise.
They write:
As things currently stand, RET is silent on this case because there
are no states in common across the two bets: `heads on a toss of a
fair coin' and `even number on a roll of a fair die' are, on the face of
it, dierent states. Yet, we want to say that (Bet 2) is preferable to
(Bet 1) by compelling dominance-like reasoning. The obvious move to
make here is to stipulate that we can identify `heads on a toss of a
fair coin' and `even on a roll of a fair die' because they have the same
probability, and that's all that matters. We thus supplement RET with
this probabilistic identication of states: the states under one action
can be identied with the states under a dierent action in the same
decision problem i there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
two sets of states that maps each state under one action to a state of
equal probability under the second action.
This second emendation is somewhat imprecise: the one-to-one correspondence
Colyvan and Hajek have in mind can't be between fheads ; tailsg and f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g
(these sets have dierent cardinalities), but rather between fheads ; tailsg and
feven; oddg, i.e. fheads ; tailsg and ff2; 4; 6g; f1; 3; 5gg. Minimally, then, the
intention here must be to allow that families of states on which the outcomes
of a certain action are constant might be amalgamated prior to \probabilistic
identication"{so if the state space of an action is \unnecessarily ne-grained",
that won't be an impediment to probabilistic identication.7
To understand our quarrel with the resulting theory (call it \supplemented RET"),
consider the following desideratum (proposed by Seidenfeld et. al. 2009):
Coherent Indierence: The dierence of two indierent variables should be
indierent from the zero variable.
We accept Coherent Indierence. For suppose that X and Y are indierent
variables. One ought to be indierent between the status quo and an arrangement
where one borrows X (interest free) and repays it immediately. But to borrow
X, exchange it for Y and then repay the X simply yields a net gain of Y  X.
But let W be a St. Petersburg gamble, and independently toss a fair coin. Let
X = W if heads; otherwise X = 0.
Y = W if tails; otherwise Y = 0.
7Colyvan and Hajek probably want to allow more comparisons than those provided by the
\minimal" suggestion in the text. Indeed, that suggestion won't even allow one to compare Bet
3, which pays 6 if the coin lands heads and nothing otherwise, with Bet 4, which pays 6 if the die
lands on anything other than one (and nothing otherwise). That limitation would not sit well
with Easwaran (2014), for example, who writes: \The central observation in the development of
my theory is that if one ought to prefer act A to act B, and one ought to be indierent between
acts B and C, then one ought to prefer A to C." (Taking A =\accept Bet 4", B =\accept Bet
2" and C =\accept Bet 3", this principle calls for Bet 4 to be deemed preferable to Bet 3.)
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Supplemented RET is indierent between X and Y , but silent regarding the
comparison of Y  X with 0. (It regards Y  X and 0 as incommensurable.) It
therefore violates Coherent Indierence.
The rst thought that a defender of supplemented RET will have is that its domain
of comparison might be extended in some way. (Restoring Coherent Indier-
ence, in particular.) Indeed, such moves were explicitly left open by Colyvan and
Hajek, who wrote \It is worth seeing how far we can proceed with...state iden-
tication, perhaps supplementing it with something a little more sophisticated."
Our claim, however, is that in allowing identication of states, Colyvan and Hajek
have already proceeded too far. To see why, consider the following desideratum:
Transitivity of Indierence: If X is indierent from Y and Y is indierent
from Z then X should be indierent from Z.
We acceptTransitivity of Indierence for reasons very similar to those ground-
ing our acceptance of Coherent Indierence. For if one is indierent to trading
X for Y and indierent to trading Y for Z, it seems to us that one is thereby
indierent to trading X for Z (the net result of conducting both trades).
Accepting both desiderata, our objection to supplemented RET is as follows:
Main Objection: There is no consistent extension of supplemented RET that
satises both Coherent Indierence and Transitivity of Indierence.
Our proof of this goes by way of an example from Seidenfeld et. al. (2009).
Suppose thatCH is an extension of supplemented RET satisfying bothCoherent
Indierence and Transitivity of Indierence; we will show that CH must
be inconsistent. To this end we let (following Seidenfeld et. al. 2009) X be a
geometric random variable with P (X = n) = 2 n, n = 1; 2; : : :. Let a fair coin be
tossed independently of X, and let W = 2X (a St. Petersburg variable). Next let
W1 = 2W if heads and W1 = 2 if tails;
W2 = 2 if heads and W2 = 2W if tails
Employing state identications consistent with Colyvan and Hajek's practice, one
may check that W , W1 and W2 are mutually indierent under supplemented
RET, and hence under CH. By Coherent Indierence, then, we get that both
W1  W and W  W2 are indierent from 0 under CH and so, by Transitivity
of Indierence, from each other. Then (again by Coherent Indierence),
2 = (W1 +W2)  2W = (W1  W )  (W  W2)
is indierent from zero{an inconsistency. qed
The objection may alternatively be formulated as vulnerability to a nitary Dutch
Book. Suppose that a supplemented RET-obeying agent starts with a long posi-
tion in W1. She trades this for a long position in W ; by state identication, she
regards this trade as fair. Now she learns the valuation W = k, and accepts the
following fair bet. If a previous independent toss of a fair coin landed heads, she
wins k   1 for a net of 2k   1; if the toss landed tails, she loses k   1 for a net of
1. As it happens, this is the very coin toss used in the determination of W1 from
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W , i.e. W1 = 2k if heads and W1 = 2 if tails. Therefore the agent's net is exactly
W1   1, meaning that she is 1 unit of currency worse o than when she started.
The culprit here is plainly the identication of states{which, it's worth noting,
Colyvan and Hajek weren't fully comfortable with themselves.8 They wrote:
\RET needed...state identication to deliver various compelling dominance-like
verdicts. But perhaps we've jumped from the frying pan into the re here."
But RET does not require state identication to deliver the sought-for verdicts.
Indeed, when comparing experiments dened on distinct spaces, some join of
these spaces may be chosen to model each. In the above example involving Bet
1 and Bet 2 (where one may realistically assume that the tosses of coin and die
are independent, even if one is merely counterfactual), the independent join is
appropriate. This has four states: heads even, heads odd, tails even and tails
odd. Bet 1 will have payout vector (b1; b2; b3; b4) = (5; 5; 0; 0) and Bet 2 will have
payout vector (a1; a2; a3; a4) = (6; 0; 6; 0) with P (X = i) =
1
4
, i = 1; 2; 3; 4. An
easy computation now gives REU(A;B) = 1
2
> 0, so A is preferable to B.
If that's right then Colyvan and Hajek's account of state identication isn't nec-
essary for RET after all, and there is nothing to prevent one from oering as
extensions of RET theories not subscribing to any such account. Indeed, the
cost of Colyvan and Hajek's second emendation would appear to preclude state
identication so far as \conservative" extensions of RET are concerned.
The implied directive is clear: keep Colyvan and Hajek's emendation to REU
Dominance about order independence, but jettison the one about state identi-
cation. The resulting theory is a joint extension of expected utility theory and
dominance reasoning accomplishing much in the way of Colyvan's initial concerns:
Order-independent Relative Expectation Theory (ORET): Let X be any
random variable taking values in the natural numbers N = f1; 2; : : :g. Let Game
A pay ai and let Game B pay bi when X = i. Dene REU(A;B) =
P
i2N P (X =
i)(ai   bi) provided this sum's value is independent of the order of the indices.
(I.e. whenever E(aX   bX) has a value in the extended reals.) Then Game A is
preferable to Game B if and only if REU(A;B) 2 (0;+1]. Game A and Game
B are incommensurable if REU(A;B) is undened.
ORET recovers the \clear" comparisons (Altadena preferable to Pasadena, etc.)
cited by Nover and Hajek. A further virtue is that it never indicates a preference
for a gamble X over an identically distributed gamble Y .
Theorem 1. Suppose that aX and bX are identically distributed and REU(A;B)
is dened. Then REU(A;B) = 0.
8The decision theory described in the third section of Easwaran (2014) (entitled \One Version
of the Theory", i.e. of the general type described in the rst two sections) advocates for state
identications, and so is vulnerable to the current objections. Easwaran however hedges as
follows: \I think that the relations presented here are normative for decision theory, but if some
of them are not, then they can be switched out for others that might do some of the same work."
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Proof.9 We may assume without loss of generality that REU(A;B)  0. Let
A and B be the random variables aX and bX , respectively. Suppose for reductio
that E(A   B) > 0. Fix k large enough that E(minfk;A   Bg) > 0. Let An
and Bn be the truncations of A and B at [ n; n], respectively. (I.e. An = A
if jAj  n, but An = n when A > n and An =  n when A <  n, etc.) One
easily checks that minfAn   Bn; kg ! minfA   B; kg almost surely. Moreover,
jminfAn Bn; kgj  jminfA B; kgj. So by the dominated convergence theorem,
E
 
minfAn  Bn; kg

! E
 
minfA B; kg

> 0:
But An and Bn are identically distributed, so for all large enough n
0 = E
 
An  Bn

 E
 
minfAn  Bn; kg

> 0;
a contradiction. qed
5. Objections to ORET
As noted, agents subscribing to ORET do not ever prefer a gamble X to an
identically distributed gamble Y . They also possess immunity from nitary (see
footnote 4 and the appendix) Dutch Books. These are apt properties for a decision
theory to have; still, there are objections that can be made against ORET.
First Objection: Group Dutch Books
Utility-pooling groups of agents subscribing to ORET are vulnerable to \Group
Dutch Books" if the agents comprising the group can make unilateral decisions
and believe that it's possible to confer a good of unbounded expected utility:
San Marino Game: Stanley and Stella are ORET subscribers married in the
state of Louisiana, where they have what is known as the Napoleonic Code (ac-
cording to which what belongs to the wife belongs to the husband also and vice
versa). Stanley (together with a lawyer acquaintance) has devised a plan capi-
talizing on the fact that a gift of money on Stella's birthday is theoretically free
under the Code. To liven things up, he presents to Stella a Huntington Library
postcard with an enclosed coupon reading \Happy Birthday Stell. Luck is believ-
ing you're lucky! This coupon good for one Pasadena gamble, payable in dollars."
Stella complains to her sister (Blanche) that although she has accepted the \gift"
she's realized she could end up owing Stanley money under its terms. Blanche
(a sometime adjunct scholar) sees an opportunity and oers to administrate the
gamble. First, however, Blanche shows Stella a partition fPi : i = 1; 2; : : :g of
the naturals such that, for every i, the expectation of the Pasadena gamble in
question exists and is equal to  1 conditional on the gamble paying from a state
n 2 Pi, and shows Stanley a partition fQj : i = 1; 2; : : :g of the naturals such
that, for every j, the expectation of the Pasadena gamble in question exists and is
equal to +1 conditional on the gamble paying from a state n 2 Qj. She explains
to them both that the Pasadena gamble pays Pn with probability pn, n = 1; 2; : : :
9Our original proof was needlessly complicated; this simplication is due to Mate Wierdl.
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and that they will learn which cell from their own partition contains n and be
given a chance to cancel their position (for a price) after receiving this informa-
tion but before learning the value of n. Blanche now puts Stanley and Stella to
sleep in separate rooms. While they are asleep she rolls dice to determine n, then
wakes them up. Blanche now goes to Stella and tells her the unique value i for
which n 2 Pi. At this point Stella realizes that the expected value of the gamble,
from her perspective, is  1. Blanche now oers, as she promised, to sell her a
short position in the same gamble{for a mere $5. Stella gives Blanche the money,
eectively cancelling her long position. Blanche then goes to Stanley and tells
him the unique value j for which n 2 Qj. At this point Stanley realizes that the
expected value of the gamble, from his perspective, is +1. Blanche now oers, as
she promised, to sell him a long position in the same gamble{for $150. He agrees
to the transaction, which eectively cancels both his own short position and her
long. The Stanley/Stella team has lost a sure $155{a \Group Dutch Book".
Second Objection: Innitary Dutch Books
Vann McGee (1999) used an \airtight Dutch Book" in an attempt to show that the
combination of innite state space and unbounded utility function leads expected
utility theory subscribers to decision theoretic incoherence. McGee's Dutch Book
is innitary; in particular it consists in an innite sequence of payos (wi)
1
i=1 such
that
P
iE
 
minfwi; 0g

=  1. So while expected utility theory sanctions each
bet considered by itself, simultaneous acceptance of them would appear to violate
the spirit of ORET. Indeed, it's an easy matter to express any no-expectation
wager as an innite series of nite expectation wagers, so clearly ORET must
be taken to implicitly sanction against simultaneous acceptance (or acceptance
within any bounded window of time) of wagers constituting such a series.
Even with this clarication, however, individual ORET-subscribing agents who
believe themselves to have lifespans of innite expected duration are still subject
to innitary Dutch Books administered across time. To see this, consider the
following twist on an experiment from Arntzenius, Elga and Hawthorne (2004):
Trumped. Donald Trump has just arrived in Purgatory. God explains that
the duration X of his afterlife will be an instance of the St. Petersburg random
variable (equal to 2n with probability 2 n), in days. Variety is the spice of the
afterlife, however, and Trump will have the option, on Day 1, of spending that
day in Hell in exchange for Days 4; 8; 12; : : : ; 1020 in Heaven (each contingent on
his being around). This is an expected two days and he nds Heaven to be as
pleasant as Hell is unpleasant, so he takes the deal. On Day 2 he agrees to spend
that day in Hell in exchange for Days 1024; 1028; 1032; : : : ; 218 4 in Heaven (again
an expected two days). And so forth...each day numbered 4n Trump spends in
Heaven, but he spends the other days in Hell in exchange for contingent days
28k+2; 28k+2 + 4; : : : ; 28k+10   4 in Heaven, k = 2; 3; : : :. Expected utility theory
recommends each bet, but the result of accepting them all is that Trump spends
at least three-fourths of his afterlife in Hell.
Though Trump only accepts one wager per day, though their negative payos
are bounded below and though there are almost surely only nitely many such
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wagers, the door is left open to the Dutch Bookie by the fact that their negative
expected payos nevertheless sum to minus innity, due to the fact that the
expected number of wagers is innite.10
Third Objection: Missed Arbitrages
Adam Elga (2010) has an arbitrage argument against imprecise credences that
can be turned against the ORET subscriber. Suppose you are oered a dollar to
take a long position in X, a no-expectation random variable. If you subscribe to
ORET then X and the dollar are not commensurable, so if you believe that the
oer is made in good faith then you'll presumably decline it. Moments later you
are oered a dollar to take a short position in X. Again you decline. Nothing
changes if we assume that you have prior knowledge of the protocol. That's
apparently irrational, as accepting both oers strictly dominates rejecting them.
6. How Anthropic Reasoning Lowers Expectations
The problems raised in the previous section look, at rst anyway, quite hopeless.
One solution suggests itself: deny that innite expectation (or no expectation)
gambles are possible. Richard Jerey (1983) has taken this line. Most philoso-
phers will be unsatised with this solution, however. McGee (1999), for example,
writes that \a global plan cannot aord to ignore exotic possibilities". He opines:
\If it were somehow assured to me that, for the price of one licorice jellybean I
could guarantee that, if there is indeed an afterlife, my place in it would be one
of boundless bliss, I would give up the bean." Having constructed his innitary
Dutch Book against agents having such attitudes, McGee concludes that there is
simply no way to \avoid being defeated by our own ill-planned actions."
Hajek (2006) concurs. Citing \regularity" assumptions on which one should not
assign probability zero to events of discrete type (e.g. this St. Petersburg gamble
is genuine) that are not logically contradictory, Hajek writes:11
Suppose I oer you the St. Petersburg game. You don't believe me; in fact
you assign probability one in a trillion to the oer being genuine. Still,
the paradox has a hold on you: for now the expectation of the game is a
trillionth of innity, which is still innity.
For ORET, which would become a vacuous extension of classical expected utility
theory should innite expectation variables be banished from decision theory, the
point is especially pressing. There is, however, a way to allay Hajek's concerns less
radically{arrange that the expectation of the variable equal to Hajek's dubious
St. Petersburg gamble, if it be genuine, and equal to zero otherwise be nite, yet
non-zero.12 This is apt to sound ad hoc and desperate. However, we shall argue
10This sort of disaster can't befall Trump if he knows his afterlife to have expected duration
(in days) E(X) = L < 1. This is a consequence of the optional stopping theorem (thanks to
an anonymous referee for this point). It is also a consequence of Theorem 2 in the appendix,
which establishes that nitary Dutch Books are precluded under ORET more generally.
11Cf. the \contagion" issue raised in Hajek and Smithson (2012).
12By, for example, setting the probability of veracity equal to some innitesimal hyperreal 
and setting the expectation, conditional on veracity, equal to a nite non-zero multiple of  1.
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that it's a rationally mandated consequence of the anthropic principle. Brandon
Carter (1983; see also A. Lewis 2001), formulates this principle as follows:
\In a typical application of the anthropic (self-selection) principle, one is
engaged in a scientic discrimination process of the usual kind in which one
wishes to compare the plausibility of a set of alternative hypotheses, H(Ti),
say, to the eect that respectively one or other of a corresponding set of
theories T1; T2; : : : is valid for some particular application in the light of
some observational or experimental evidence E, say. Such a situation can
be analysed in a traditional Bayesian framework by attributing a priori
and a posteriori plausibility values (i.e. formal probability measures),
denoted by pE and pS, say, to each hypothesis respectively before and
after the evidence E is taken into account, so that for any particular
result X one has
pE(X) = pS(XjE);
the standard symbol j indicating conditionality. According to the usual
Bayesian formula, the relative plausibility of two theories A and B, say, is
modied by a factor equal to the ratio of the corresponding conditional a
priori probabilities pS(EjA) and pS(EjB) for the occurrence of the result
E in the theories, i.e.
(1)
pE(A)
pE(B)
=
pS(EjA)
pS(EjB)
pS(A)
pS(B)
:"
The \Selected" or \Subjective" probability function pS in (1) is related to an
\Original" or \Objective" probability function pO by pS() = pO(jS): \S de-
notes...the selection conditions that are implied by the hypothesis of application
of the theory to a concrete experimental or observational situation, but which are
not necessarily included in the abstract theory" on which pO is based.
It's implicit from Carter's own usage of the principle that a \theory" meanwhile
is a family of measures on the set of universe histories rather than a chance or
ineliminably indexical event such as \this toss of this coin lands heads". Examples
of \theories" from Carter (1983) include the hypotheses: life is very rare, even in
favorable conditions; gravitational coupling strength is xed across time; and, the
expected average time t intrisically most likely for the evolution of a system of
observers intelligent enough to comprise a scientic civilization such as our own
is geometrically small relative to the main sequence lifetime fi of a typical star.
Indeed, where A is a theory your nomologically accessible evidential counterparts
(possible beings with thoughts indiscriminable from your own) should intend by
\A" the exact same proposition you intend by \A"; in particular, the two utter-
ances should be associated with the same truth value. (Your counterparts aren't
actual beings contemplating a dierent coin or counterfactual beings for whom
the coin landed otherwise than it actually did.) The importance of this restriction
cannot be overstated, for Carter wishes to employ the identity
(2)
pS(A)
pS(B)
=
pO(A)
pO(B)
;
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which will not in general be valid for \non-theory" events A and B.13
Consider now the following two premises.
First premise. The theory that there are no innite expectation gambles should
be assigned positive probability.
Second premise. There is an upper bound on the rate at which utility can
accrue.
Accepting these, the expectation one ought to assign to an encountered St. Peters-
burg gamble after applying Carter's anthropic principle isn't innite, but nite.
For suppose that Trump, on his rst (and only) day in Purgatory, is oered a St.
Petersburg variable X of days in Heaven14 in exchange for Y days in Hell, where
Y is either 10 or 300 based on the toss of a fair coin. (Trump is told the value
of Y prior to making his choice.) We again suppose that Trump values x days
in Heaven at +x, x days in Hell at  x, and x days in Purgatory at 0. If Trump
refuses the oer, his afterlife terminates at the end of the day. If he accepts, it
terminates upon settlement. Trump is typical; every other conscious being in the
universe faces an analogous afterlife gamble (we assume their pre-afterlife lifetimes
are negligible) and that they are all rational and know the relevant protocols.
Suppose further that Trump entertains exactly two competing theories about the
universe. Theory A says that the St. Petersburg oers X that one encounters in
the afterlife are genuine. Theory B says that they are not genuine; in fact, their
true expectations are precisely 50 days. Prior to invoking anthropic reasoning,
Trump assigns Theory A positive probability  < 1
2
. According to the sort of
reasoning Hajek implicitly cites, then, the expected number of days Trump will
spend in Heaven, should he accept, is ()1+(1  )50 =1. He should therefore
accept, regardless of the value Y .
13Cf. Sleeping Beauty, where the majority intuition is that (2) fails for A = heads, B = tails,
vs. Bostrom's \Presumptuous Philosopher", where the majority intuition is that (2) holds for
A = trillion trillion persons and B = trillion trillion trillion persons. See Bostrom (2007).
14A referee suggests a line of resistance to this argument: assume instead (against the second
premise) that Trump is oered one day in \St. Petersburg Heaven", i.e. a Heaven oering a
single-day experience which, with probability 2 n, will be as gratifying as 2n days in Hell is un-
gratifying. This method of realizing an innite expectation payo requires one to countenance
the notion of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction, presumably) \singularities". (In an instant's com-
pass, great hearts sometimes condense to one deep pang, the sum total of those shallow pains
kindly diused through feebler men's whole lives.) Note however that for the objection to work,
unbounded quantities of satisfaction would have to be{to put the matter somewhat crudely{
\crammed into a bounded quantity of consciousness". Put to the choice, this is where we would
draw the line. Wherever satisfaction is singular with respect to spacetime, the currency of
anthropic reasoning (\consciousness", if you like) is singular with respect to spacetime as well.
(The referee responds \...the argument...seems to assume that utility is hedonic rather than just
a representation on the amount one cares about outcomes in the world". But if the idea is that
one might \care about a world one will not see", this just reverts to the situation treated in the
main text. It doesn't matter there that Trump experiences the days in Heaven himself; if they
are experienced by others and Trump is, e.g., a utilitarian, nothing relevant changes.)
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If we take Carter's anthropic principle into account, however, this computation
breaks down. Assume for the moment that every being accepts the oer of X days
in Heaven for Y days in Hell when Y = 10, but refuses when Y = 300. Let P be
the event \I am now in Purgatory". Conditional on Theory B, half of all agents
encounter Y = 10 and accept the ensuing oer; these agents spend an average of
61 days in the afterlife (1 in Purgatory, 10 in Hell, and an expected 50 in Heaven).
The other half encounter Y = 300 and refuse the ensuing oer; these agents spend
1 day in the afterlife (in Purgatory). It follows that the expectation of Trump's
afterlife conditional on B is 31 days, so that pS(P jB) is the multiplicative inverse
of this expectation, i.e. 1=31.
Next assume, for the time being, that E(XjA) is large but nite. Then
L =
1
2
(1) +
1
2
 
11 + E(XjA)

= 6 +
1
2
E(XjA)
is the expectation of Trump's afterlife conditional on A. pS(P jA), meanwhile, is
equal to L 1. One therefore has
pP (A)
pP (B)
=
pS(P jA)
pS(P jB)
pS(A)
pS(B)
=
L 1
1=31

1  
;
from which it follows that pP (A) =
31
31+L(1 )
and pP (B) =
L(1 )
31+L(1 )
. Trump
now computes the posterior expectation of X as follows:
E(X) = pP (A)E(XjA) + pP (B)E(XjB) 
31(2L  12)
31+ L(1  )
+
L(1  )(50)
31+ L(1  )
:
Letting L!1, we get E(X) = 62
1 
+ 50  112 when E(XjA) =1.15
Suppose next that the agents do accept when Y = 300. Then the expectation of
afterlife duration conditional on B would be 1
2
(61 + 351) = 206 and the expecta-
tion of afterlife duration conditional on A would be L = 156 + E(XjA), so that
pS(P jB) =
1
206
and pS(P jA) = L
 1. So
pP (A)
pP (B)
=
pS(P jA)
pS(P jB)
pS(A)
pS(B)
=
L 1
1=206

1  
;
from which it follows that pP (A) =
206
206+L(1 )
and pP (B) =
L(1 )
206+L(1 )
. So:
E(X) = pP (A)E(XjA) + pP (B)E(XjB) 
206(L  156)
206+ L(1  )
+
L(1  )(50)
206+ L(1  )
:
Letting L ! 1, E(X) = 206
1 
+ 50  256 when E(XjA) = 1. So E(X) < 300
whether the agents accept when Y = 300 or not. (Whence they don't.)
15This seems a fair way to compute E(X); as alluded to in footnote 12, one could also come
to this conclusion via nonstandard analysis by letting L be an appropriate innite hyperreal (so
that L 1 is innitesimal).
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If that's right, then the claim that assigning even a tiny positive probility to a
claimed St. Petersburg variable's veracity requires you to assign the variable an
innite unconditional expectation can be resisted. In fact premise 2, together with
Carter's anthropic principle, establishes something like the opposite. Namely, that
assigning positive probability to the theory that faithful St. Petersburg gambles
are impossible requires you to assign gambles advertised as St. Petersburg gambles
nite unconditional expectation whenever they are encountered.
Note however that the above computation cannot be adapted to sharply evaluate
gambles that have no expectation conditional on their being genuine; one might
obtain nite upper and lower bounds on the value of such gambles by this method
(and could bring these to within the distance of McGee's bean by setting one's
prior credence in the impossibility of innite expectation gambles near 1)16, but
precise evaluation would continue to render agents vulnerable to a nitary Dutch
Book. Such observations support Nover and Hajek's (2004) contention that \the
Pasadena game is more paradoxical than the St. Petersburg game in several
respects." Indeed, they suggest that such no-expectation gambles must be given
their due, at least by anyone superstitious enough to entertain the theory that
they are possible. Ideal agents, to whom the complete theory of everything is
transparent, will apparently (with high probability) be unwilling to entertain such
a theory. Those whose epistemic limitations oblige them to assign it probability
some  > 0, meanwhile, must simply accept the implied vulnerability.17
7. Appendix
In Section 5 we saw that ORET subscribers are vulnerable to group Dutch Books
and to innitary Dutch Books. The content of the following theorem is that they
needn't worry about nitary Dutch Books.
Theorem 2. Individual ORET subscribers are not vulnerable to nitary Dutch
Books.
Proof. Let (
; ) be a probability space and let (Fn)
1
n=0 be a ltration on 
.
That is, for each n, Fn is a ff-algebra of measurable subsets of 
, with F0  F1 
F2     . For n = 0; 1; 2; : : :, let Xn be a real valued random variable dened on

. We assume that X0 = 0 a.e. and E(Xn+1  XnjFn)  0 a.e., n = 0; 1; 2; : : :.
The idea here is that Xn represents the agent's bankroll at timestep n. Also at
time step n (or shortly after), the agent is assumed to learn which cell of Fn
obtains. The agent then consents (between time n and time n + 1) to a gamble
having payo Xn+1   Xn. Since the agent knows which cell of Fn obtains and
E(Xn+1  XnjFn)  0 a.e., the agent is at least indierent to these gambles (she
may view them as favorable), so we can assume that she accepts them.
The challenge for the would-be nitary Dutch Bookie is to construct a random
variable T such that the gambles stop at time T (that is, the agent's nal bankroll
16Replacing the genuine St. Peterburg variables by genuine Pasadena variables in the rst
calculation of the Trump example yields bounds E(X) 2 [50  62
1 
; 50 + 62
1 
].
17Thanks to Mate Wierdl, the editors of Synthese, and the anonymous referees.
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is XT ) and XT < 0 a.e. We require that for every n, f! 2 
 : T (!)  ng 2 Fn.
(T is a stopping time; the bookie is allowed to know no more than the agent{when
the gambles have stopped, the agent will know this.) For the Dutch Book to be
nitary, one of following two additional conditions must be met (cf. footnote 4).
First Condition: T (!)  K a.e. for some K <1.
Note that E(X1jF0) = E(X1   X0jF0)  0 a.e., which implies in turn that
P
 
E(X1jF1)  0

> 0.
Next note that E(X2jF1)  E(X1jF1) a.e. (both may = +1), so that
P
 
E(X2jF1)  E(X1jF1)  0

> 0:
This, in turn, implies that
P
 
E(X2jF2)  E(X1jF1)  0

> 0:18
Having shown that
P
 
E(XnjFn)  E(Xn 1jFn 1)      E(X1jF1)  0

> 0;
note that E(Xn+1jFn)  E(XnjFn) a.e. This implies that
P
 
E(Xn+1jFn)  E(XnjFn)  E(Xn 1jFn 1)     E(X1jF1)  0

> 0;
which implies in turn that
P
 
E(Xn+1jFn+1)  E(XnjFn)  E(Xn 1jFn 1)     E(X1jF1)  0

> 0:
By induction, then, one has
P
 
E(XK jFK)  E(XK 1jFK 1)  E(XK 2jFK 2)     E(X1jF1)  0

> 0:
There is, therefore, a positive measure set F 2 FK such that
E(XK jFK)  E(XK 1jFK 1)  E(XK 2jFK 2)     E(X1jF1)  0
a.e. on F . We may, moreover, assume that T (!) is constant on F , say T (!) =
n  K, ! 2 F . We therefore have
F 

! : E(XnjFn)(!)  0
	
\ T 1(n) = Fn 2 Fn:
Now if XT (!)(!) < 0 a.e. then Xn(!) < 0 for a.e. ! 2 Fn, which implies
that E(XnjFn)(!) < 0 for a.e. ! 2 Fn, contradicting the denition of Fn. So
P
 
XT (!)(!)  0

> 0 and there is no Dutch Book.
Second Condition:
P1
n=0E[(Xn+1  Xn)   1fT>ng] <1.
Let (XTn )
1
n=0 denote the stopped process, dened by X
T
n = Xn if n  T and
XTn = X
T
T when n > T . Notice that E(X
T
n+1   X
T
n jFn)  0 a.e., n = 0; 1; 2; : : :
and XTn (!)! XT (!)(!) a.e. Let now
M =
1X
n=0
(Xn+1  Xn)   1fT>ng:
18There is a positive measure set F 2 F1 such that E(X2jF1)  E(X1jF1) a.e. on F .
To assume that E(X2jF2) < E(X2jF1) a.e. on F leads to an immediate contradiction, as
integrating both sides of this equation over F yields E(X2  1F ) < E(X2  1F ). So, there is a
positive measure set F 0 2 F2 (with F
0  F ), on which E(X2jF2)  E(X2jF1)  E(X1jF1) > 0.
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Then E(M) =
P1
n=0E[(Xn+1 Xn)  1fT>ng] <1 by the monotone convergence
theorem. Moreover one has
 M  XTn  XT (!) +M (1)
a.e. Since E(XT )  E( 2M) >  1, either E(XT ) = +1, or E(XT ) is nite.
In the latter case, (XTn ) is uniformly integrable by (1) and so
E[XT ] = lim
n!1
E[XTn ]  E(X
T
0 ) = 0
by the dominated convergence theorem, since E(XTn+1)  E(X
T
n ) in the integrable
case. So in either case, E[XT ]  0 and there is no Dutch Book. qed
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